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This article maps key points of contact between Christian doctrine and recent advances 
in cultural evolution. Beginning with theological anthropology, the article shows that 
cultural evolution problematizes purely substantive accounts of the image of God. 
Moving to the doctrine of sin, we explain how cultural evolutionary findings enrich and 
challenge distinct aspects of hamartiology. The article turns to moral topics, since 
cultural evolution sheds light on altruistic and hypersocial behavior; additionally, we 
show how belief in moral deities and observation of religious rituals provide an 
evolutionary advantage. Finally, the authors analyze whether cultural evolution 










Ancient maps are entertaining for modern observers, not primarily because of what the 
cartographer knew, but because of what s/he did not know. Medieval maps are 
especially intriguing in this respect, with their floppy and misshapen continents, 
completely lacking the Americas, Australia, and Antarctica. On those yellowed 
parchments, the oceans are frequently embroidered with fantastic sea creatures, and at 
the edges of the maps, in regions little-known to explorers of that era, medieval 
cartographers would sometimes pen the phrase hic sunt dracones (“here be dragons”). It 
was the cartographer’s way of saying, “This land or sea is unknown, savage, 
dangerous—best left alone.”  
 On the theological maps of 20th-century Christianity, the regions of cosmology 
and evolutionary biology were often annotated with hic sunt dracones, vel diaboli, 
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although the past two decades witnessed a surge of engagement between faith and 
modern science. Nonetheless, even after students of Christianity come to terms with 
better-known scientific topics, when they venture to explore a new field of science, the 
tendency is to wonder whether in this unknown terrain there might dwell theological 
dragons, if not devils.  
In the past 20 to 30 years, scientific research has advanced in the field of “cultural 
evolution.”i While intrepid scientists are exploring its topography, theological 
scholarship on the most recent findings is still limited. We propose to fill this gap and 
provide a “theological cartography” of contemporary cultural evolution, stimulating 
more robust theological engagement therewith by mapping the parts of cultural 
evolution that are pertinent, poignant, or perilous for Christian doctrine.ii  
We begin by providing a brief overview of the findings in the field of cultural 
evolution that are relevant for theology. On that basis, we will explore the ramifications 
of cultural evolutionary insights for theological anthropology (particularly for the 
image of God) and hamartiology (the doctrine of sin). The topic of sin will open up 
broader questions of morality (specifically, regarding altruism and hypersociality). 
Finally, we will examine whether religious rituals and the fundamental belief in God 
might merely be byproducts of cultural evolution.   
 
 
A Summary of Cultural Evolution 
 
Most popular conceptions of evolution focus solely on the genetic level of evolutionary 
change at the expense of extra-genetic factors involved in natural selection. This has 
been so since the 1930s and 1940s, when the insights of population genetics were 
integrated into Darwin’s account of natural selection—“the preservation of favourable 
individual differences and variations, and the destruction of those which are 
injurious”iii—as the engine of evolutionary change. Since then, genes have been 
considered the primary factors in population changes.  
There now exists a considerable movement to redress the focus on the change of 
gene frequencies over time.iv Beginning in the 1970s, advances in embryology and 
molecular genetics made clear that phenotypic variation is not solely based on 
differences in genes, but very often on the same genes being expressed or not. Thus, 
evolutionary developmental biologists (“evo-devo”) insist that the regulation of genetic 
expressions has been neglected in the Modern Synthesis’s account of evolutionary 
change. In particular, molecular geneticists argue that epigenetic factors—cell activities 
that modify genetic activation—play a significant role, not just in organismic 
functioning and development, but also in evolution as these factors are also heritable 
across generations. Then, in the 1980s, ecologists, ethologists, and anthropologists began 
challenging the account of evolutionary change that posited organisms are not solely 
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passive with respect to their genetic inheritance—surviving only at the mercy of 
congruence, or the lack thereof, between their inherited traits and the environment. 
Rather, according to niche construction theorists, organisms “co-construct and co-evolve 
with their environments, in the process changing the structure of ecosystems”.v  
Just in the past few years, some evolutionary theorists have called for an extended 
evolutionary synthesis to integrate the discoveries and insights from developmental 
biology, molecular genetics, ecology, and ethology. On the latter point, human 
ethology—the study of human behavior—has also become increasingly represented 
among evolutionary theorists. It is from this angle that the evolution of culture has 
received more prominent attention in recent years. Culture, it has been argued, also 
evolves in a Darwinian fashion;vi not only that, the evolution of culture itself contributes 
to biological evolution via cultural niche construction.vii   
The evolution of culture is not a recent arrival on the scientific scene. In The 
Descent of Man, Darwin discussed the “inherited habits” progeny acquired from 
parents; he also referred to “customs,” “education,” “laws,” and “public opinion” to 
explain the evolution of societies.viii But today more than ever, extra-genetic 
mechanisms are recognized to play a critical role in the evolutionary process. Therefore, 
theologians ought to engage with recent findings in cultural evolution, because it is 
increasingly becoming a major player in our understanding of evolution as whole. 
What is cultural evolution? Alex Mesoudi defines culture itself as “Information 
that is acquired from other individuals via social transmission mechanisms such as 
imitation, teaching, or language”, further specifying that the “information” in question 
refers to “knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, norms, preferences, and skills”.ix Culture is, 
then, simply the store of knowledge, practices, and norms for a given social group.  
Culture evolves because it is a kind of “inheritance system”: we do not receive 
only our genetics from our parents, but are educated by them and by others in our 
communities; and the cultural traits we adopt give us a relative selective advantage in 
our environments. For example, a young chimpanzee might learn from its mother to 
select and prune a thin stick to access safari ants deep inside their colony. This cultural 
adaptation will help the young chimp survive because it means they will have access to 
a consistent food supply and will be able to reach sexual maturity. So, a culturally-
transmitted practice can produce a selective advantage.  
Cultural evolution largely depends on two major forces: innovation and social 
transmission.x Innovation refers to the ability of a single individual or set of individuals 
within a society to develop a novel practice or tool relative to shifting ecological 
changes. These innovations can come about through fortuitous circumstances (like 
Alexander Fleming discovering mold on his petri dishes, which led to the manufacture 
of penicillin) or direct rational reflection on the task or norm that seeks intentionally to 
make the practice or tool better.xi Innovation can be the beginning of cultural revolution. 
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But innovations need not lead deterministically to radical cultural change, because the 
innovation needs to be transmitted to others in the society for such upheaval to occur.  
How does selection function at a cultural level? One might think that if one tool 
or practice were more efficient than another, it would spread quickly throughout a 
group, but it need not do so. The nature of social transmission helps to explain why 
some things catch on and lead to cultural change and others do not. Major contributing 
factors include: (1) the nature of the teaching/learning process (Is it directed and explicit 
or is it caught by observation?), (2) how cooperative the society happens to be (Is it 
more or less altruistic?), (3) the existing norms and rituals that are operative for a given 
social group (Are there existing norms or rituals that might clash with or 
enhance/dovetail with the new cultural practice or tool?) and (4) the functional novelty 
of the new cultural practice or tool (Does the practice or tool better complete the 
intended aim than others available?). This is a list of just some of the possible 
influencing factors that lead to cultural evolution. 
 Having sketched the contours of current thinking on cultural evolution, we can 
proceed to fill in the map, explaining how Christian theology might relate to or be 





We begin by outlining the ramifications of cultural evolution for theological 
anthropology, specifically focusing on what it means for humans to be “the image of 
God”. J. Wentzel van Huysteen and others have made significant strides in relating 
theological anthropology to the evolutionary sciences, including cultural evolution.xii 
One of the most significant features of this dialogue concerns human distinctiveness. 
Van Huysteen locates such distinctiveness in relational terms and in the human 
symbolic, linguistic, and imaginative capacities. Joshua Moritz contends the distinctive 
feature that grounds the image of God is a particular kind of relationship to which God 
calls and elects humans. Philip Hefner avows similar distinctive features and adds to 
them the culturally creative capacity of human beings. Indeed, many recent theologians 
and Christian thinkers prefer to construe human distinctiveness in terms of cultural 
markers rather than exclusively emphasizing genetic attributes. They have good reason 
to do so; given that human beings share upwards of 98% of their DNA with their closest 
primate relatives, genetics does not seem sufficient to ground the distinctive claims 
inherent in the image of God.  
Scientists themselves are increasingly discovering that our cultural differences 
from other animals contribute decisively to human uniqueness. For example, some 
research explains that advances in human culture and knowledge over those of other 
higher primates are due, in significant degree, to mechanisms such as: the higher degree 
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to which humans imitate (paying attention to processes), rather than just emulate 
(focusing exclusively on outcomes), and the extent to which we innovate, teach, and 
function cooperatively in the pursuit of common goals. Scientists such as Michael 
Tomasello indicate human culture is “cumulative” in a way no other animal culture 
approximates.xiii This means that successive generations of humanity build on the 
innovations and stores of knowledge of the previous generation, accumulating over 
time in ways that allow a “ratcheting effect”: preventing successive generations from 
losing the cultural knowledge of the past generation, and enabling them to improve 
upon that knowledge. Even the most sophisticated ape cultures (in captivity and in the 
wild) do not exhibit such advanced “cumulative culture”. 
We are not, however, saying that our way of functioning is for the most part 
qualitatively different from that of other apes; they still imitate to varying degrees, they 
still teach to varying degrees, they still cooperate, they have many unique traditions 
(culture) which they transmit distinctly, they have rudimentary capacity for language, 
they solve problems, etc. We are different from the other apes by degrees, not just 
genetically but in the way we function culturally, and those degrees of difference are 
key factors in making us distinctively human.  
 Cultural evolution fleshes out further what is distinctive about human 
reasoning.xiv Instead of simply emulating modeled behavior insofar as we understand 
how an action results in a given outcome, we “over-imitate”, repeating causally opaque 
processes, which enables us to perform complex actions even if we do not understand 
why they work.xv Humans also innovate in higher degrees than do other apes, meaning 
that we can build further on causally opaque processes to establish ever-more complex 
procedures. Moreover, the human tendency to over-imitate is embedded in an 
orientation towards sociality: our capacity for teaching and social learning, as well as 
our sensitivity to group norms and conformity, make us far more inclined to over-
imitate others and to capitalize on the innovations in our groups. Likewise, our 
tendency for extreme cooperation beyond the limits of kinship-based altruism ensures 
higher levels of learning from multiple sources and maintains higher levels of fidelity in 
the transmission of information across generations. While most of these characteristics 
can be identified in attenuated ways among other apes, their quantitative intensity and 
simultaneous operation in humans actually makes our human brand of reasoning 
uniquely productive.  
Even with this nuanced apprehension of how humans reason in unique ways, 
the lack of categorical qualitative distinctions between our reasoning and other animals’ 
reason should make us wary of a purely “substantive” anthropology, which identifies 
the human intellect and rationality with the image of God (pace e.g. Augustine, Trin. 
13.4.6; 13.7.10–8.11; Aquinas, ST I Q. 93, Art. 2, 4). That is not to say that reason is 
irrelevant to our being the image of God. The present authors are inclined towards a 
relational and functional theological anthropology,xvi but there is little doubt that our 
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creative and rational faculties play key roles in our capacity to function as God’s image. 
Accordingly, we would not exclude all “substantive” features of theological 
anthropology; one simply ought to recognize the pitfalls of locating human theological 
distinctiveness in putatively qualitative differences between us and other apes. The 
human sort of reasoning is special and enables us to be the image of God, but it does 
not exhaust what it means to be God’s image.  
In this regard, we agree with Aku Visalaxvii that contemporary strategies which 
short circuit any substantive or structural talk when incorporating evolutionary 
findings into the conception of the human being simply fail to appreciate how 
important substantive features are to other models of the imago Dei. For example, a 
functionalist account of theological anthropology will focus on the vocational 
responsibility of humans to serve as God’s representatives in the world, especially on 
the basis of Genesis 1:26-28; the logic of Gen. 1:26-28, however, depends irreducibly on 
the physical presence and operations of humans qua God’s representatives, suggesting 
that humans’ unique role in the world cannot be separated from their distinctive 
physicality.xviii A similar challenge obtains for relational accounts of theological 
anthropology, which argue that the image of God consists of the distinct relationship 
human beings have with God. For such a relationship to be possible, the human being 
must possess certain relational capabilities (e.g., a robust theory of mind). Therefore, 
even though cultural evolution corroborates the case for functional and relational 
models of the image of God, one ought not to exclude attention to features typically 
foregrounded by structural theological anthropologies.  
 
 
Cultural Evolution and the Doctrine of Sin 
 
The cultural-evolutionary dynamics of over-imitation, learning, and conformity do not 
simply support the transmission of technical knowledge; indeed, these dynamics are 
likely to propagate a wide variety of actions and beliefs. This observation is of no little 
importance for the Christian doctrine of sin and, therefore, comprise an entire 
“continent” in our theological cartography of cultural evolution.  
It is nothing new to discuss how evolutionary theory influences our 
understanding of sin. Some have identified the evolutionary biological impulses 
towards reproduction, self-preservation, and violence as accounting for human sinful 
behavior. On this construal of things, human lust or selfishness or murder are largely 
part of our biological inheritance.xix Humans remain moral agents responsible for how 
they respond to these biological impulses, but biological evolution contributes to our 
moral corruption.  
Without denying the biological contribution to humans’ immoral inclinations, 
cultural evolution adds texture and nuance to our understanding of human sinfulness. 
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Benno van den Toren has pointed out the connection between sinful inclinations and 
the human penchant for over-imitation and our tendency to conform to our parents and 
educators.xx If human parents are given to behaviors which are sinful, it follows that the 
next generation would replicate that behavior and even innovate upon it, as a sort of 
hamartiological ratchet effect. This description of the evolutionary dynamics of sin fits 
neatly with the classical doctrine of sin as a moral corruption: biological and cultural 
evolution strongly incline us towards sinful behavior, per the doctrine of concupiscence 
(e.g. the “sin nature”, which affirms that the human volition is corrupted and thus 
inclined to sin), but they do not necessitate that we sin in any given scenario. Thus, 
humans are morally responsible for their sins, even though their biology and 
susceptibility to cultural transmission of sinful behaviors mean that, given sufficient 
time, they will certainly sin voluntarily (in other words, non posse non peccare).  
Locating the origin of human sinful impulses in biological and cultural 
evolutionary dynamics does problematize the traditional narrative according to which 
the sin of Adam and Eve (the “originating sin”) gave rise to all subsequent sin. In spite 
of the fact that cultural evolution helps explain the rise of (proto-)virtuous behaviors 
such as altruism and hypersociability, it also sheds light on the origins of our violent, 
sexually promiscuous, and selfish actions, since those same behaviors are present in e.g. 
chimps and monkeys.xxi While one would not impute sinful status to behaviors such as 
killing or sexual promiscuity when they are performed by non-human animals 
(assuming that moral awareness and therefore culpability are unique to humans and 
perhaps to some now-extinct hominids), genetics and cultural evolution would indicate 
that the human propensity towards those same actions does indeed owe, at least in part, 
to our evolutionary heritage. In other words, humans have an inclination to, e.g., kill 
their enemies because our common ancestors with chimps also had the same 
inclination, which was then transmitted to us via both genetic and cultural evolutionary 
mechanisms.  
 
Concupiscence without the Originating Sin or Original Guilt? 
 
This narrative of the origin of sinful propensities is largely compatible with the doctrine 
of concupiscence,xxii but it problematizes the traditional construal of an originating sin 
(peccatum originans), according to which the corruption of the will is traced to the single 
originating sin of Adam. If the propensity towards sinful behavior predates the rise of 
humans, then concupiscence cannot be laid at the feet of Adam (or of the first morally-
conscious human to sin). While human tendencies towards over-imitation and 
conformity would have contributed to contemporary humans imitating the example of 
the first morally-conscious sinner, those same dynamics would have been previously 
operative, as non-morally-conscious hominids observed and imitated behavior that 
would be sinful for morally-conscious hominids. In other words, the first sin should not 
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necessarily be considered the origin of all sin (i.e. the originating sinxxiii); while there 
must logically have been a first instance of a morally-conscious being committing a 
sinful action, that same action would have been previously committed any number of 
times by non-morally conscious beings (whose commission of the action cannot be 
described as sinful, insofar as moral awareness is prerequisite to culpability). So, while 
one can maintain belief in the dynamics of concupiscence, the traditional construal of a 
single originating sin qua the source of concupiscence is difficult to square with this 
evolutionary account of the origins of human sinful behavior.  
 Once the conception of a single originating sin is precluded, another component 
of the dominant western doctrinal theory of sin would be problematized: original guilt. 
The notion of original guilt holds that all humans share in the guilt of the originating 
sin, meriting damnation (even apart from their own personal commission of sins) 
because of what Adam did. If, however, there was no originating sin, then original guilt 
would become a moot point, for one could not be guilty of an originating sin that never 
was.  
Nonetheless, this incompatibility between biological and cultural evolution and 
the theory of original guilt is not as theologically problematic as one might surmise at 
first glance. While the idea of original guilt is common in Western Christianity, it is not 
a universal Christian commitment (for example, it does not figure into the 39 Articles of 
the Anglican Church, nor is it present in Eastern Orthodox doctrines of sin). Indeed, the 
belief itself is arguably morally problematic, insofar as the notion of being damned for 
the decisions of a distant progenitor offends against most notions of justice.xxiv The idea 
is nowhere explicitly affirmed in the biblical corpus and rose to prominence largely on 
the basis of a misreading of Romans 5 by Augustine of Hippo.xxv All that is to say that 
an exclusion of the notion of original guilt would not be tantamount to the rejection of 
the doctrine of sin.xxvi  
 
Alternative Approaches to the Originating Sin 
 
One could nonetheless conceive of other ways to adjust the traditional construal of 
originating sin to fit with the emerging data on biological and cultural evolution. One 
could perhaps argue, along the lines of the federalist approach to the doctrine of sin,xxvii 
that God constituted the first spiritually- or morally-conscious hominid to be the 
representative, the “federal head”, of the rest of the species, such that, when that 
representative figure sinned, the rest of the species was morally implicated in the action 
of their representative. In other words, one could decouple the idea of original guilt 
from the notion of an originating sin, and connect original guilt simply to the first sin, 
by-passing the logic of a common progenitor that was operative in constructing the 
Augustinian notion of original guilt (insofar as Augustine’s argument emphasized that 
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sin passed from Adam to the rest of humanity because of natural descent from Adam; 
Augustine, Pec. merit. 9). 
Alternatively, one might suggest that the originating sin does not function as the 
source of concupiscence, but as the fountainhead of moral awareness. In this scenario, 
the watershed moment for sin was not the first commission of a cruel or selfish action, 
but the commission of that action by the first morally-conscious human. Perhaps what 
that human then transmitted to other humans was not a sinful tendency, but a moral 
awareness that their previously-existing tendencies were sinful. While this is not the 
typical way of construing the idea of originating sin, some theologians might find it 
attractive insofar as it has plausible connections to the Genesis 2-3 narrative: in that 
account, the first sin is eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, after which 
Adam and Eve are morally aware (Gen. 3:1-7, 22). One might want to make additional 
connections to Pauline teachings about how the Law (as a source of greater moral 
awareness), under the influence of sin, generates a greater propensity towards sin 
(Rom. 7:7-25); by this token, one could argue that the transmission of moral awareness 
via cultural evolution helps sharpen concupiscent impulses, operating much like the 
Law does in Pauline theology. Finally, this approach would permit theologians to 
maintain the idea of a single sin which was the source of all other sins, without running 
afoul of scientific advances on the origins of human inclinations towards deeds which 
are sinful for morally-aware beings.  
The present authors may not consider either of these alternative approaches 
compelling, but the purpose of the present essay is not to posit a definitive theological 
stance vis-à-vis any particular feature of cultural evolution. The point is rather to 
emphasize, on the one hand, that cultural evolution can add depth to the Christian 
understanding of sin. On the other hand, theologians should be aware that cultural 
evolution does have an impact on some traditional versions of the doctrinal theory, 
although it hardly forecloses the possibility of any number of robust accounts of the 
doctrine of sin. 
 
 
Cultural Evolution and Morality 
 
Altruism, Hyper-sociality, and God-of-the-Gaps 
 
This discussion of original sin reflects the tendency of Christian theologians to 
fixate on the consequences of evolutionary theory for immoral human behavior. 
Nonetheless, evolutionary theory in general and cultural evolution in particular have 
ramifications for our understanding of human virtues, such as altruism, and make up 
some of the most fascinating “rivers” and “mountains” on the present theological map. 
The fact that humans behave altruistically has often been considered problematic for 
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conventional construals of evolution; in The Descent of Man, Darwin himself recognized 
that altruistic behavior created wrinkles for his theory.xxviii After all, if nature is indeed 
“red in tooth and claw” and favors those attributes that conduce to reproduction, it 
would stand to reason that those animals which were most selfish would be most likely 
to reproduce and pass on whatever genetic traits that  contributed to their selfishness. 
Conversely, if an animal had an impulse to sacrifice its food or life for the good of 
another animal, such an animal would be less likely to reproduce, as a consequence of 
which it would be less likely that the genetic traits which contributed to their altruism 
would be propagated. Natural selection, it seemed, ought to favor not just the fittest, 
but the most selfish organism.  
 Of course, humans regularly function in ways that are dramatically altruistic. 
Most parents would risk or sacrifice their lives to save their children; does this not belie 
the hegemonic claims of natural selection? Probably not. Evolutionary biologists refer to 
this as “kin selection.” It is entirely coherent with natural selection that one would 
behave altruistically towards one’s offspring, insofar as doing so contributes to the 
success of one’s reproduction. English evolutionary biologist W.D. Hamilton 
formulated this principle in what is called Hamilton’s Rule, arguing that the likelihood of 
a person’s willingness to risk their life on behalf of another is directly related to the 
genetic proximity of the “hero” to the victim.xxix This observation thus reinforces the 
typical construal of natural selection.  
Nonetheless, the morning news (less so than the evening news) is full of stories 
about the selfless actions and sterling heroism of social workers, soldiers, and 
firefighters in the service of strangers. Such “supererogatory” altruism is not entirely 
uncommon, and some have suggested that it is difficult to explain such non-kinship-
based altruism by appeal to evolutionary biology and reproductive fitness.  
For example, Francis Collins argued that God operated against the grain of 
natural selection in order to produce human altruism. Collins is no enemy of 
evolutionary theory, but he sees the divine hand in the supposedly evolutionarily-
improbable actions of human altruism.  
Agape, or selfless altruism…cannot be accounted for by the drive of 
individual selfish genes to perpetuate themselves. Quite the contrary: it 
may lead humans to make sacrifices that lead to great personal suffering, 
injury, or death, without any evidence of benefit.xxx  
Collins explained that this altruistic inclination so defies evolutionary impulses that it 
exposes a serious vulnerability in atheistic accounts of evolution and strongly suggests 
a divine origin.xxxi  
Collins came under fire for this sentiment, insofar as he seemed to appeal to a 
“God of the Gaps”,xxxii a strategy against which he had rightly cautioned Intelligent 
Design advocates.xxxiii The concern with this line of argumentation is that, if someone 
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should be capable of explaining how altruism did not amount to a reproductive 
disadvantage, God would be squeezed out of the altruistic gap.xxxiv  
Cultural evolution may provide precisely the wedge needed to eject the altruistic 
gap-dwelling God, insofar as it explains that natural selection does not only operate at 
the level of the organism or the family. Kin selection, group selection,xxxv and 
cooperation have proven highly effective in giving humans a collective survival (and 
therefore reproductive) advantage. Through hyper-sociality (e.g. cooperative hunting 
and child-rearing, protection against predators and rival groups, etc.), humans have 
gained an edge over against stronger, faster non-human animals. As such, the genes 
that conduce towards cooperative behavior would be more likely to spread; 
alternatively, genes conducing towards non-cooperative behavior would generate a 
reproductive disadvantage, insofar as such people would more often be excluded from 
cooperative communities. So, insofar as the sorts of impulses that facilitate cooperation 
seem highly analogous to the impulses that stimulate altruism, it stands to reason that 
altruism, even beyond the boundaries of kin-relations, does not amount to a net 
reproductive disadvantage.  
 
Hyper-Sociality and Moral Deities 
 
Cultural evolution not only explains the human tendency for moral and immoral 
behavior; it also helps account for our belief in morally-attentive deities. There is 
evidence to suggest that belief in a morally-attentive deity provides a survival benefit in 
larger groups, where kinship-based altruism is no longer operative.xxxvi For example, 
humans are less likely to cheat one another and more likely to engage in generous 
activities when prompted to think of a watchful deity.xxxvii Similarly, religious people are 
more inclined to treat their co-religionists fairly if their religion includes a moralistic 
and punitive deity.xxxviii All this might suggest that cultural evolution played a role in 
propagating the belief in a god who cares about pro-social behavior.  
 Accordingly, it has been argued that religious belief facilitates prosocial behavior 
and the formation of larger cooperative groups.xxxix Cultural evolutionary research has 
shown that larger groups preserve advantageous innovations and foster cultural 
complexity.xl So, if belief in a moralistic god facilitates hyper-social behavior (fairness, 
altruism, large-group cooperation), then belief in a moralistic god would amount to an 
evolutionary advantage, and therefore would be propagated.  
 




In light of what we have seen about how cultural evolution works, should we think of it 
as a force that inclines towards morality or immorality? The answer is probably 
“neither”, and “both”. 
On the one hand, cultural evolutionary mechanisms like the ratchet-effect 
deserve a morally neutral evaluation. Cultural evolution conduces to the advancement 
of knowledge and greater levels of productivity and interpersonal connectivity, all of 
which generates productive and reproductive advantages. But superior technology and 
social networks are in themselves neither good nor bad. Tools and relationships possess 
no innate moral status, but rather are morally evaluated on the basis of the use to which 
they are put. In this sense, cultural evolution in se inclines populations neither towards 
good nor towards evil. 
On the other hand, we have seen that cultural evolution can actually reinforce 
both positive and negative behavior, functioning as a source of moral inertia. In a 
negative sense, we have argued that over-imitation, conformity, and normativity 
reinforce the likelihood that one generation’s sinful behavior will be reproduced by the 
next generation. But in the positive sense, cultural evolution has also favored just, 
altruistic, and hyper-social behavior. Since fairness, self-sacrifice, and kindness can 
conduce to group selection, and since imitation and normativity will help reinforce 
virtuous behavior just as much as vicious behavior, cultural evolution can be seen as a 
force for good just as much as for evil.  
 
Hyper-Sociality, Free-Loaders, and Rituals 
 
Notwithstanding the undeniable benefits of the hyper-sociality fostered by cultural 
evolution, it is vulnerable to exploitation by “free-riders.” As any economist will 
explain, large group cooperation can be exploited by individuals inclined to benefit 
from the group’s resources and protection without making a commensurate 
contribution.xli The study of cultural evolution has argued, however, that ritual behavior 
helps overcome the free-rider problem.  
It may come as a surprise to hear that ritual is a major locus for cultural 
evolutionary research, but recent study suggests that religious ritual may be embedded 
in our cultural-evolutionary heritage.xlii Above we described the human tendency 
towards over-imitation, toward repeating causally opaque actions in anticipation of a 
productive outcome; this may in fact be a contributing factor in the development of 
religious rituals. The same human willingness to imitate complex processes with 
beneficial outcomes (even when we do not understand how a process generates a given 
outcome), under the pressures of normativity and conformity, also makes humans 
susceptible to imitating complex processes that may not have an immediately functional 
outcome, e.g. religious rituals.  
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Historically, religious people have often engaged in ritual worship with the 
belief that doing so will help ensure their material prosperity, appeasing their deity and 
thereafter returning to labor and the other immanent causes of material prosperity. The 
supposed connection between the worship and a subsequent good harvest is causally 
opaque. But the cognitive science of religion has suggested that humans are prone to 
“hypersensitive agency detection”, i.e. perceiving the presence of causal agents even 
when no agent is present. The so-called “Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device” 
(HADD) represents an evolutionary advantage,xliii insofar as it is better to believe that a 
potentially hostile agent is operative, and be wrong, than not to perceive the operation 
of an agent when one is present. While the evidence is as of yet inconclusive, it is 
conceivable that the HADD could in fact predispose humans towards religious belief.xliv 
At any rate, this same tendency could contribute to the development of religious 
rituals. One could well imagine that rituals arose early in human pre-history as people 
came to associate non-productive actions with events of good fortune, and thereby 
concluded that the non-productive action actually caused the fortuitous outcomes, e.g. 
through securing the blessing of a deity. This is actually part of the way that scholars of 
ancient Near Eastern religion surmise that the process of ancient divination 
developed,xlv and it is reasonable to suggest a similar origin for other religious rituals. 
While one might expect such rituals to be a drag on productivity, they may 
actually have helped solve some of the problems of human hyper-sociality. Two 
components of ritual behavior have garnered serious scientific study and both 
contribute to pro-social behavior within the ritualistic group. In the first instance, 
research has suggested that group pro-sociality is strengthened by shared, synchronous 
movements—movements of matched rhythmic behavior in time (like singing and 
dancing).xlvi Second, shared high arousal states (euphoric and dysphoric) contribute to 
psychological bonding between group members which can be correlated to increased 
prosociality within the group.xlvii What is more, because religious rituals are causally 
opaque actions that are often costly, they signal that another person shares a 
commitment to the group’s values, which in turn suggests a willingness to work 
cooperatively with the group.xlviii As a result, group members can work together as a 
larger cohesive unit, reaping the benefits of cooperation while diminishing productive 
drag of free-riders (who would be less likely to participate in costly rituals).  These 
aspects of cultural evolution help provide an account of how human religious practices 
emerged.  
This raises a question of whether one should think that the human tendency 
towards religious ritual is nothing more than an accident of our over-imitating 
tendencies and the bonding that results from shared high arousal states, which happen 
to have beneficial outcomes enabling our hyper-sociality (large group cooperation) and 
thus human competitiveness.xlix To put a finer point on it: is the fact that I engage in 
rituals like the Eucharist and tithing largely a by-product of the fact that it was 
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beneficial for my human ancestors to engage in their own ritual activities, insofar as 
doing so conduced to greater cooperation in large groups? This brings us to our final 




Does Cultural Evolution Account for the Existence of Religion?  
 
We have seen that the study of cultural evolution provides stimulating accounts 
different features of religion,l such as: why altruistic behavior flourishes in human 
society; how hyper-sociality beyond the limits of kin-selection is advantageous for 
survival; how belief in a moralistic and punitive god fosters hyper-sociality; and how 
religious rituals contribute to group selection.  
In addition, cultural evolution may also help explain the persistence of religious 
doctrine. Consider the human capacity for teaching and our social biases for conformity 
and normativity. These features of human cultural evolution, so important for 
ratcheting and thus cumulative culture, could also help perpetuate an erroneous belief 
in the existence of a deity and the right way of behaving towards that deity.li These 
ideas, once present in the community, would be difficult to root out, given the human 
tendency to conform to common practice, our capacity for teaching, and the possibility 
that belief in a just and punishing deity would reinforce beneficial cooperation.  
In conjunction, these observations raise the question of whether religious ritual 
and morality may simply be by-products or exaptations of cultural evolution. Cultural 
evolution does make it possible to give an atheistic explanation of religious belief and 
morality. But we should not overlook the fact that an equally plausible account of the 
same dynamics could be embraced from a religious perspective. One could argue that 
the mechanisms undergirding cultural evolution make us capable of perceiving the God 
who really exists; one could contend that God used cultural evolution to generate these 
attributes precisely for the purpose of enabling and supporting our encounter and 
sustained relationship with him. Over-imitation or normativity need no more to imperil 
the legitimacy of my religious rituals and my knowledge of God than they imperil the 
legitimacy of my quotidian professional habits or my knowledge of Newtonian physics. 
Just because my bio-cultural evolutionary inheritance enables me to accomplish 
complex but mundane life tasks and to acquire progressively more-complex 
knowledge, does not mean that my complex life tasks or knowledge are somehow 
rendered insignificant. Having the necessary hardware for a task does not delegitimize 
or falsify the ends to which the hardware is used. So also, having a cultural-
evolutionary capacity to pursue and know about God (who may or may not exist) does 
not mean that my relationship with and knowledge of God are necessarily spurious.lii 
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One might counter that those mechanisms identified by cultural evolutionary 
research do more than just enable religion; perhaps, like a misfiring of the 
Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device, they actually incline people to adopt and 
transmit religious behavior as a consequence of human over-imitation (i.e. our 
willingness to repeat actions without knowing what might be their outcomes, because 
of a high degree of openness to the possibility that the non-productive behaviors might 
actually have mysterious beneficial outcomes). This is an important objection. In a 
similar vein, psychological research indicates that from an early age children are given 
to “promiscuous teleology”, i.e., they are inclined to assign purpose and design to 
objects and phenomena which adults would consider non-purposive (e.g. rocks are 
pointy so that animals don’t sit on them, or so that animals can scratch themselves 
when they have an itch).liii Children also have an innate tendency to attribute different 
life-cycle traits and ways of knowledge to non-human (e.g. supernatural) agents; their 
inborn psychological hardware is amenable to the possibility of supernatural or divine 
agents whose lives and actions are not simple anthropomorphizing extrapolations.liv For 
these reasons, some psychologists have suggested that children are “intuitive theists”;lv 
they are naturally amenable and even disposed to the existence and action of 
supernatural agents in the natural world. In sum, one could argue (reductively) that 
theism is simply a consequence of our cultural-evolutionary constitution, or at least that 
our propensity towards teleofunctional explanations of reality would “make notions of 
purposeful creator beings especially resonant”.lvi  
Conversely, however, one could see this cultural-evolutionary wiring as amenable 
to the claims of Christian theology. It stands to reason that a God who desires to be 
known by people would reasonably (even necessarily) equip them with the sort of 
neurobiological and cognitive equipment conducive to their encounter with him.lvii 
Given the Christian construal of the character and will of God, it would seem 
incongruous for God not to compose us in such a fashion as to coax and sustain 
knowledge of and relationship with him.lviii The mere anthropo-biological facts of 
cultural evolution do not amount to a metaphysical explanation for the existence of 
those facts; rather, one must test the facts against different atheistic and religious 
explanations. There is a difference between efficient and final causes, between a 
biological process and the philosophical account one gives of that process’ significance 
or purpose, or, to use the language of Richard Swinburne, between scientific and 
personal explanations.lix  
Alister McGrath has argued that Christian theology should not engage with 
science in order to prove the existence of God. Instead, theology begins from the 
posture of Christian faith and inquires whether the phenomena of nature cohere with 
the God made known in Christian revelation. “Natural theology emphasizes the 
resonance between the framework offered by the Christian faith and observation”.lx The 
findings of cultural evolution and cognitive science do not seem to stand in tension with 
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a God who desires to be known by humanity (agency detection, promiscuous 
teleology), to transmit that knowledge across generations (teaching, conformity, 
normativity), to shape and mobilize humanity in its image (cumulative culture, 
innovation, cooperation), and to foster love of family and neighbor (altruism and hyper-
sociality). Quite the contrary, it seems reasonable to imagine that the Christian God 
might use cultural evolution to create beings sensitive to its existence, inclined to 
perceive its agency, and disposed to act with compassion towards others, even when 





This article has been an exercise in theological cartography, an attempt to map out the 
terrain of cultural evolution in order to ascertain whether its seas and topography are 
diabolical or divine. After these preliminary explorations, there seems to be little need 
to stamp any portion of the map with the warning hic sunt dracones. There seem to be no 
more dragons lurking in cultural evolution than there were in the Atlantic in the 15th 
century. Many portions of the map need filling in, and some of the terrain could prove 
treacherous should one try to traverse it in an imprudent fashion; cultural evolution 
might prove perilous, for example, to those who would appeal to an altruistic God-of-
the-Gaps. Similarly, cultural evolution raises intriguing questions about the origins of 
religious rituals, although those questions are by no means disastrous for Christian 
faith. Rather, if one is concerned about the apologetic ramifications of cultural 
evolution, one needs to ask whether those mechanisms are somehow contrary to the 
character of the God, what purposes God might have for those mechanisms, and 
whether those purposes provide an account of the cultural-evolutionary phenomena 
that are as convincing as those offered in a nontheistic framework.  
Cultural evolution is undergoing lively exploration today and cartography is 
always an ongoing task. The first maps created of any terrain make no claims of 
comprehensiveness, and often reveal more about the concerns of the mapmakers and 
the culture in which they ply their trade. In this exercise of theological cartography, we 
do not presume to have provided exhaustive detail; like most early explorers, we 
sought to map the territory that is currently most relevant to theologians exploring 
cultural evolution. Just as plate tectonics, tides, volcanic activity, and erosion alter coast 
lines and even create new islands and continents, the authors expect that this 
theological cartograph will be refined as scientists explore new terrain. At very least, 
however, this mapping will help prevent theologians from running aground on some 
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